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I. Geography2
By tradition law is a subliminally geographical concept as all ideas about order start from
the natural environment and are, therefore, geographical in their inner core.' The Greek
term nomos (compare anomal) indicates "pastural land" (compare nomade), and the modern
terms tax haven and offshore corporations demonstrate the ongoing relevance for the busi-
ness world.4 But it is exactly this concept that is weakening or withering away because of
new technologies, a development that led Richard O'Brien to announce "the end of ge-
ography."5
A. LIMITS
The term "global corporate actors" also has a geographic connotation: it refers to the
growth and interconnection in trade and financial markets across national boundaries by
the ability to use technology rapidly and, thus, widely increase the international flow of
know-how, assets, and capital in size and speed ("global village"). 6 It tells us that corpora-
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tions are by definition just everywhere.' But the term "global" is Delphi: it also tells us that
"geography" as a link between particular locations and particular rules loses its attraction.
Where are the global actors located; where is their center of gravity; and what location
legitimizes the application of local rules to the whole or to parts of the "entity"? The
geography of economic globalization is strategic and creates a new grid of economic trans-
actions superimposed on the old geo-economic patterns. What is then left of the traditional
geographical pictures serving as a genuine link for regulation, be it country or state? Is the
old hierarchy still intact?
A global corporation can quickly make decisions and allocate resources internationally
on the basis that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. We are confronted with a
vast network for marketing and servicing products with highly diversified centers of activity.
The global corporation is also a perfect example for the proposition that technology and
reduction of transaction and coordination costs are important factors in shaping the law.,
The rise and fall of transaction costs destroys old and constitutes new markets-and markets
make law, inevitably!
"The subjugation of human lives to the influence or control of corporate actors on the
international plane is a matter of contemporary concern for many."9 The Brandeis view of
the "Frankenstein monster" from his famous dissent in Louis K Liggett Co. v. LeeI0 rises to
global dimensions. It cries for action." Small wonder that the developing experience with
global corporations-they themselves a product of transaction costs-is producing and
accelerating innovative regulatory approaches.
B. NEw TECHNOLOGY
This change goes along with a change from the "real" world into the "virtual" world of
cyberspace. Due to new technology, in particular the Internet, geographical location in the
real world does not matter as much or as less than hitherto. 2 Cyberspace is an invisible,
intangible world of electronic information with manifold interactions; by decreasing trans-
action and coordination costs, it eliminates space and time; it makes distances and borders
largely disappear. Consequently, firms have a much wider choice of actions and locations;
markets often have no "fixed abode."" Computers, telephones, and planes create a virtual
world that does not need its anchor in a particular territory. New communication tech-
nologies have erased former barriers to economic exchange and governments lose "their
formerly uncontested powers of sovereignty." ' 4 Entrenched principles about state interven-
tion and individual freedom are doomed to conflict."s
7. See id. at 58.
8. See GROSSFELO, supra note 4, at 82.
9. Fluer Johns, The Invisibility of the Tranmational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law, and Legal
Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 893, 922 (1994).
10. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, and 567 (1933).
11. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Internationalisierung und internationale Rechnungslegung als Fuehrungaufgabe, 4
DIE AKrIENGESELLSCHAFT (AG) 155 (1999).
12. See Trevor Cox, Information and the Internet: Understanding the Emerging Legal Framework for Contract
and Copyright Law and Problems with International Enforcement, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 23 (1998).
13. O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 1.
14. Ignacio De Leon, The Dilemma of Regulating International Competition Under the WM System, 3 EUR.
CoM. L. REv. 162 (1997).
15. Seeid. at 165.
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Certainly, not all geography is gone; it is still used as an evocative, often emotional, point
of reference (i.e., "Deutsche Bank," "made in Germany," "Swiss watch," "Dutch cheese").
As far as corporations are concerned, there will also remain the conflict between more
internationally oriented shareholders and more locally oriented stakeholders-and that is
already part of our problem. But in general, the relevance of geography will be reduced to
particular situations, be it because of physical barriers (Isle of Man), of climate (malaria),
of travel expenses (St. Helena), or of language differences (Chinese). The less commodity-
like the product is, the more likely geography is retained. Yet, as markets become integrated
"the need to base decisions on geography will alter and often diminish."
16
The modern economy depends on worldwide information and, in particular, its "blood-
stream" money is an information product. 7 The medium is the message; signs control the
meaning and the effects. The way in which the information is processed will influence its
role. "Hence the radical change being experienced by information technology today."'
Consequently legal authorities lose control over their territory. The disregard of national
borders makes it difficult or just impossible for any individual state to regulate global cor-
porations effectively.' 9 However, this does not mean that the importance of state actors is
simply evaporating. They will act as facilitators of the globalization process while producing
new forms of legality.20 They continue to provide and to control the court system and the
means of enforcement. But the globalization creates regulatory inconsistencies and demands
for a certain amount of re-regulation.
C. OLD PROBLEMS
Though we might expect dramatic changes, the problems are not as new as they appear
to be at first glance. Invisibility, virtuality, and cross-border activities accompany the cor-
poration's legal existence from its very beginning; we are confronted with differences in
degree not with totally unforeseeable problems. From the times of Bank ofAugusta v. Earle,'I
we have learned that corporations are artificial beings, "enchanting fictions" and "lovely
whimsies" as Archibald MacLeish called them.2" Or, as the Supreme Court in Bank of Au-
gusta pronounced:
It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the
law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can
have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another
sovereignty.2 '
Thus, invisibility and virtuality were closely connected with concepts of geography-but
even more with loosening the grip of geography in view of cross-border transactions: the
16. O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 2.
17. See id. at 7.
18. Id.
19. See Blacken, supra note 6, at 62.
20. See id. at 64.
21. Bank of Augusta v. Earl, 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
22. Archibald MacLeish,Apologia, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1507 (1972); cf. Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado,
Panthers and Pinstripes: The Case of Ezra Pound and Arcbibald MacLeisb, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 907 (1990).
23. Bank ofAugusta, 38 U.S. at 588.
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town of Augusta sits on the Southern bank of the Savannah River in Georgia, right off the
border to South Carolina. Concepts and commercial necessities of "neighborhood," the
lack of distance, limited the efforts for "localization" and opened the doors for a then
"global" world. That is why the Supreme Court continued:
But although it must live and have its being in that state only, yet it does not by any means
follow that its existence there will not be recognised in other places; and its residence in one
state creates no insuperable objection to its power of contracting in another. It is indeed a
mere artificial being, invisible and intangible; yet it is a person, for certain purposes in con-
templation of law, and has been recognised as such by the decisions of this Court.1
4
A glance at the map predicts the court's decision. The necessities of cross-border business
overcame geographical limits under the guise of "comity of nations," 5 opening the door
for a still unknown global future. Accordingly, Archibald MacLeish describes the "Cor-
porate Entity" as follows:
The Oklahoma Ligno and Lithograph Co
Of Maine doing business in Delaware Tennessee
Missouri Montana Ohio and Idaho
With a corporate existence distinct from that of the
Secretary Treasurer President Directors or
Majority stockholder being empowered to acquire
As principal agent trustee licensee licensor
Any or all in part or in parts or entire ...
The Oklahoma Ligno and Lithograph Co
Weeps at a nude by Michael Angelo.26
Though corporations may "not weep at the beauty of works of art, ... they have more
dramatic ways of demonstrating their independence of humanity"-exerting invisible




Even today we are inevitably bound to concepts of geography. Thus, the real problem is
not geography but the appropriate location as a link for regulation. Global corporations
live in so many different places at the same time that possible regulatory links and com-
petition abound. Although we all know that the multitude of unilateral, bilateral, and re-
gional approaches is sub-optimal, we still meet deep skepticism towards transborder reg-
ulatory cooperation.28
So far, international law has done little to cope with transnational corporations. 9 Fore-
most was the creation of the Commission on Transnational Corporations in 1974. The
24. Id.
25. Id. at 589.
26. MacLeish, supra note 22, at 1507.
27. Id. at 1507-08.
28. See Johns, supra note 9; cf. Raymond Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, 47 FOREION AFF. 110 (1968).
29. Se Johns, supra note 9, at 893.
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Commission produced several Draft Codes of Conduct, the last in 1990. Such Codes were
widely advocated as "non-legal" methods of advocacy. But consensus on a final Code was
never achieved, and the Code never formally adopted. The possibility of such scheme is
currently being mooted; it will likely remain just "a noble statement of principle," not
drawing corporations to their rank. 3° Thus, international law is largely irrelevant to activities
of transnational corporations."
B. WORKERS' RIGHTS
The question may, however, get a new turn in view of the international labor abuse by
transnational corporations operating in economically developing regions, the key sentence
being: "Nike is paying Vietnamese workers $1.60 a day, the minimum wage in Vietnam,
but three basic meals there cost $2.10."' National laws and international law so far have
not been successful in protecting workers' rights." The World Trade Organization (W"TO)
as the primary regulator of trade throughout the world does not explicitly protect workers'
rights. Corporate Codes of Conduct cannot fill the gap, though they may serve a benchmark
function.34 There is, however, the chance that the tide will turn.
The turning point may be the case Doe v. Unocal Corporation,3s in which Burmese citizens
stated claims against an American oil company for human rights abuses, including torture
and slavery. The court invoked concepts of international law rules against slavery; it dis-
cussed the act of state doctrine and granted subject matter jurisdiction as long as Burmese
citizens were unable to obtain access to judicial review in their own country because of the
absence of a functional judiciary:36
Because nations do not, and cannot under international law, claim a right to torture or enslave
their own citizens, a finding that a nation has committed such acts, particularly where, as here,
that finding comports with the prior conclusions of the coordinate branches of government,
should have no detrimental effect on the policies underlying the act of state doctrine. Accord-
ingly, the act of state doctrine does not preclude this Court from considering claims that are
based on legal principles about which the international community has reached unambiguous
agreement."
[H. Corporation Law
Geographical concepts still govern the choice of law in corporation law.', "Delaware,"
"corporate homes away from home," "state of incorporation," and "seat theory" are key
30. Id. at 914; Ryan P. Toftoy, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater: Is Nike Doing
It?, 15 ARiz. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 905, 914 (1998).
31. See Johns, supra note 9, at 898.
32. Toftoy, supra note 30, at 905.
33. See Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc., 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992); International
Labor Rights Educ. and Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1991); and Alfaro v. Dow Chem.,
751 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
34. See David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal
Fields and the Creation of TransnationalArenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 407 (1998).
35. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 962 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
36. Id. at 899.
37. Id.
38. See Jack L. Goldsmith III, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of a Choice of Law
Method, 98 YA L.J. 597 (1989).
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words for the traditional approaches 9 Consequently, Dedev Vagts based his seminal article
on the regulation of transnational corporations on the notions of "home state" and "host
state."4 But is it still meaningful to reduce the legal life of global players to these links?
Can they serve the needs of a global economy of a global regulation? Can they legitimize
a regulation that is acceptable both for the global corporations and for the many countries
in which they operate? Can we take "Delaware" out of her American context?41
A. DELAWARE
1. Clash of Opinions
The question has often been discussed with regard to Delaware's powerful position in
corporate charters. Could this be a model for the world setting the standards for global
corporate actors worldwide?4 The critique started with Justice Brandeis's forceful dissent
in Liggett, with terms like "race to the bottom," "state competition for corporate charters,"
and "Frankenstein monsters."43 William L. Cary's article, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware,- launched a full attack-but evoked likewise powerful answers in
support of Delaware. 41 Responding to Cary, the defenders argue that he failed to consider
the interaction between law and market forces. They believe that the market in corporate
shares will take care of the problem: if Delaware law would adversely affect the shareholders'
interests, the value of a Delaware firm's stock would decline relative to stock in a comparable
firm incorporated elsewhere. This would negatively affect managers by threatening their
job (danger of hostile takeovers) and, thus, compel them to "seek the state whose laws are
most favorable to shareholders."- This turns the picture upside down: from race-to-the-
bottom to race-to-the-top! Too beautiful and too logical to be true! What is a comparable
firm? How can shareholders find out? The reactions have statistical dimensions over time
-who controls the statistics? What about management and propaganda? What does an
outsider really know from paper?4' In addition, markets need time to react-and what
happens in the meantime in particular to small investors that cannot wait? Managers have
ample means to retard market reactions and to use them in their favor-in particular, when
they are not looking for long-term perspectives for themselves. Poison pills of all sorts
would not be introduced into corporate charters if they would not be regarded or held out
(towards timid spirits) as offering at least some help to foster management entrenchment.4
39. See Werner F. Ebke, Company Law and the European Union: Centralized versus Decentralized Lawmaking,
31 INT'L LAW. 961 (1997).
40. Vagts, supra note 2.
41. Cf. P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 86 (1985).
42. Cf. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976); Joel P.
Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional
Analysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 470 (1996/97).
43. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 541.
44. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974).
45. See Roberta Romano, State Competition for Corporate Charters, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Rob-
erta Romano ed., 1993).
46. Id. at 88.
47. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Language, Writingand the Law, 5 EURO. REV. 383 (1997).
48. See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurirprudence, 19 J.
CORP. L. 583 (1994); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection
or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1993); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and
the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996).
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Today, therefore, the claims are more moderate: managers are expected to select a state
of incorporation that is "also" favorable to shareholders-whatever that means. Words,
words, words-and nobody knows for sure where wishful thinking, self-interest, and pure
myth of an "economic analysis of law" (though valuable within limits) is taken for reality.
Does life accept our theories? The critique directed against Cary is not as devastating as
its promoters tend to believe. The issue is open.
It has to be remembered that "Delaware" triggered a reaction through the federal Se-
curities Laws. The proxy rules under section 14 and the antifraud rules under section 10
of the Security Exchange Act 1934 became the pillars of American corporate governance;
"Delaware" probably would not have survived without them. Who would invest in a publicly
held Delaware corporation that is not registered with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission? Delaware just cried for support by an authority outside the sphere of Delawarian
interests. Detlev Vagts tells us. "Were it not for such legislation the flight to Delaware-
or some even softer jurisdiction-would have prevailed entirely and the protection of the
shareholder would have been diminished to the point where investor confidence would be
quite inadequate to support a broadly based public market.
''49
2. Doubts
The optimistic view upon Delaware is shaded when asking for the chances to escape from
Delaware under another law. Are alternatives available? Is there a perfect market for cor-
porate charters, or does Delaware command a dominate market position, even a monopoly?
The answer is open. Ehud Kamar sees the market for corporate laws, as imperfectly com-
petitive, not yielding optimal results to shareholders.50 He argues that the status as the
leading incorporation state gives Delaware competitive advantages that are difficult to
match by other jurisdictions. According to him, Delaware enhances these advantages by an
indeterminate, judge-oriented law that makes application by Delaware courts a necessity
and "thus excludes non-Delaware corporations from network benefits."" His point is that
because of its market power, Delaware's corporation law can be less determinate than is
optimal for sure and yet attract corporations. 2 One conclusion, however, is inevitable:
Delaware utilizes her market power first in her own interest-the corporation law is a
"proprietary product of Delaware"53 and is handled as such. It is not necessary to refer to
public choice-theories.
Putting these arguments in perspective and transferring them to the international level
gives them even more power. Within the United States, the overall position of the economy
is not at stake; the money stays within the United States. This changes dramatically in a
cross-border situation: the money leaves the national realm and there is little hope that it
will ever come back. Advantages for one state will not be balanced out in the long run in
favor of another state, nor will they be kept within reasonable proportions by a feeling of
sitting in the same boat. A common umbrella of constitutional requirements or securities
49. Dedev F. Vagts, Conflict of Laws, 18 Am. J. COMP. L. 863, 864 (1970) (book review).
50. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLuM L. REV. 1908
(1998).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1910.
53. Id. at 1955.
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laws does not exist; there is little chance that national authorities will take into account
foreign interests for their own sake.
B. CONTINENTAL EUROPE
1. Traditional View
So far, the prevailing view in Europe is different. Under the concept of European diver-
sity, the main concern here is to keep competition for corporate charters at bay and to
prevent "corporate homes away from home." This position has to do with the existence of
sovereign states (not just federal states), language barriers, and different social structures.
Within short distance we find other consensual patterns of commonplace exchanges (cul-
ture) and, therefore, clearly distinguishable business environments.5 4
This European tradition stands behind the seat theory in most Continental European
countries." The theory underlines the public functions of corporate actors and corporate
governance; it stresses the importance of corporate law for a balanced economic and po-
litical structure of the national cultures.5 6 Therefore, the theory requires that firms have
their principal place of business (real seat) in the country of incorporation. Firms incor-
porated outside the "seat" state will not be recognized as legal entities and will not be
granted the privilege of limited liability. Thus, the consequences of a wrong "incorporation"
are very harsh-making the seat theory a powerful instrument of national corporate gov-
ernance and preserving the stringencies of the corporation laws. In the Daily Mail case, the
European Court of Justice upheld the theory in view of the current state of the Community
law-as long as the rule is reasonable and necessary to protect legitimate interests of Mem-
ber States. The Court went straight into the time-honored "nature" of a corporation: in
that regard it should be borne in mind that, unlike natural persons, companies are creatures
of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist
only by virtue of the varying national legislation that determines their incorporation and
functioning.5 The final answer, however, had technical underpinnings:
Moreover, Article 220 of the Treaty provides for the conclusion, so far as is necessary, of
agreements between the member-States with a view so securing inter alia the retention of legal
personality in the event of transfer of the registered office of companies from one country to
another. No convention in this area has yet come into force.5
2. Doubts
But the seat theory has its flaws. It makes it difficult, if not impossible, to move corporate
headquarters from one country into another without liquidation and re-incorporation.
Quite understandably, therefore, it is controversial whether the Daily Mail decision still
54. See MICHAEL J. ULMER, HARMONISIERUNGSSCHRANKEN DEs AKTIENRECHTS (1998).
55. See Ebke, supra note 39, at 966.
56. See Ross Grantham, The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights for Company Shareholders, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 554
(1998); see also James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 31 (1998); Alfred Koller, Bemerkungen, AJP/PJA, at 95 (1997); MICHAEL BECKER, VERWALTUNGSKONTROLLE
DURCH GESELLSCHAFTERRECHTE (1997).
57. Case 81/87, Regina v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Review ex parte Daily Mail and
General Trust plc., [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 [hereinafter Daily Mail]; see also Case C-221/89, Regina v. Secretary
of State for Transport ex parte Factortame, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589.
58. Daily Mail, supra note 57.
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stands. Doubts are nurtured by the recent Centros decision of the European Court of
Justice. 9 The case came before the Court from Denmark.6° Denmark follows the Nordic
registration theory, under which the decisive connecting factor is the company's country
of registration. Under Danish law, registration is compulsory for public and private limited
companies. In this context the question arose whether and to what extent the Danish rules
of required minimum capital and employee representation could be circumvented by using
English private limited companies.
The facts of the case are as follows: "Centros Limited," a company registered in England
with a share capital of £100, had been purchased by a Danish couple. Both became members
of the board of directors though they had no connections with England nor had they ever
attended a company meeting there. The address of the company is that of a friend who
also allows other companies to use his address for a fee. A witness had stated, "it is easier
to find £100 than Dkr. 200.000"61 (the minimal capital amount under Danish law). The
company then filed an application for the registration of a branch with the Danish regis-
tration authority. This authority asked where the company carried on its principal business
and where its management was located. As such statement was not made registration was
refused.
On appeal, the Danish Supreme Court referred the case to the European Court ofJustice
for a preliminary ruling pursuant to article 177 of the EC Treaty. The Court asked the
following questions:
Is it compatible with Article 52 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with Articles 58 and 56 thereof,
to refuse registration of a branch of a company which has its registered office in another
Member State and has been lawfully founded with a company capital of £100 (approximately
Dkr. 1000) and established under the legislation of that Member State, where the company
does not itself carry on any business but it is desired to set up the branch in order to carry on
the entire business in the country in which the branch is established, and where, instead of
incorporating a company in the latter Member State, that procedure must be regarded as
having been employed in order to avoid paying in company capital of not less than Dkr. 200.000
(at present Dkr. 125.000)? 6z
The European Court of Justice held that Denmark had violated articles 52 and 58 of the
EC Treaty-provoking a flood of articles on the vitality of the seat theory. As the Court
did not mention the Daily Mail decision, it seems to appear that "recognition" was not in
point, corporations remain "creatures of national law," and the national law "determines
59. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erthvers-og Selskabbsstyrelsen, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999); see Wer-
ner F. Ebke, Das Scbicksal der Sitztheorie nach dem Centros- Urteil des EuGH, 11 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 656 (1999);
Robert Freitag, Der Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht, 9 EUROPAISCHE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FUER WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (EuZVW) 267 (1999); Stefan Leible, Note, 7 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT (EuZW) 267 (1999); Stefan Leible, Note, 7 NEtE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
(NZG) 300 (1999); Guenter H. Roth, Gruendungstheorie: 1st der Damm gebrochen?, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 861 (1999); Peter Ulmer, Scbutzinstrumente gegen die Gefabren aus der Geschaeftstaetigkeit
inlaendischer Zweigniederlasmngen von Kapitalgesellchaften mitfiktivem Auslandsitz, 11 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 662
(1999); and Erik Werlauff, Auslaendische Gesellschaft fuer inlaendische Aktivitaet, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 867 (1999).
60. See Peter Krueger Anderse & Karsten Engsig Soerer, Free Movement of Companies from a Nordic Perspec-
tive, 6 MAASTRICHTJ. EUR. & COMP. L. 47, 59 (1999).
61. See Centros Ltd., [199912 C.M.L.R. 551.
62. See id.
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their incorporation and functioning." But the issue is awaiting clarification by future de-
cisions of the European Court of Justice.
C. PROSPECTS
It looks as if "Delaware" is difficult to transfer on the international arena. Delaware is
part of a federal system with unifying and traditional factors with which it interacts. The
laxity of Delaware law is partly offset by very severe procedural rules. Derivative actions,
class actions, punitive damages,61 contingency fees, strike suits, pretrial discovery, and ex-
traterritorial reach of jurisdiction are probably the more important names of the game.
These procedural devices are often missing in other countries. As already mentioned, it can
be argued that "Delaware" would not have survived without the support from the federal
securities laws. As indicated by Detev Vagts, this "genius" of American corporation law set
the frame within which Delaware could operate and on which the markets could rely-
even more than on Delaware. 64 The federal securities laws kept Delaware on a level of
trustworthiness. Who would buy shares in a Delaware corporation not registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission? 6 The internal position of Delaware can also be
explained by the fact that there is a common language link and, thus, no problems of
translation (we are not "lost" in translation). All this changes drastically with cross-border
activities, and with the meeting of different cultural experiences and hopes.- The old ques-
tion then comes up again: "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the
whole world?" 6 7
But the problem is not Delaware's alone. The seat theory runs into the problems with
the virtual reality. Where is the virtual center of gravity? Can it be geographically delineated
around a seat concept? Where are the corporate "brains" when decisions are taken in In-
ternet conferences, when in a decentralized global world various headquarters are bound
together and interact with each other over the Internet? The Daimler/Chrysler merger
created two headquarters, one in Stuttgart and one in Dearborn-barely managing to stay
under German law by giving Germany a slight preponderance. 6 Transnational corporations
set up networks that make them (equally?) present everywhere. They are no more present
in Delaware or in the country of their seat than anywhere else. Do these geographical links
give any legitimacy to the control asserted? Are all countries "Delawares" or "Trobriand
Islands" only differing in the ability to extend their rules by shear power or by appeal to
the strongest economic actors (pax americana?). Are geographically centered rules still up
to date in a world of shareholder value? Are the geographical words just ghosts from the
past, magical illusions hiding the moving forces in a global network? We meet the limits
of geography; do we ever reach the end of geography?
63. See BERNHARD GROSSFELD, DIE PRIVATSTRAFE (1961); Richard E. Speidel, Punitive Damages and the Public
Interest Model of Securities Arbitration: A Response to Professor Stipanowicb, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 99 (1997); and
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization ofArbitration, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 99 (1997).
64. Vagts, supra note 2.
65. See Romano, supra note 45; Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of
Contrast Between the United States and England, I COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 51, 70 (1998).
66. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Law asa ComprehensiveApproacb, 1 RICHMONDJ. INT'L L. & PoLITIcS
1 (1999).
67. Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (1808) (Lord Ellenborough, C.J.).
68. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Brueckenbauer, in GEDAECHTNISSCHRIFT ALEXANDER LUEDERITZ (forthcoming
2000).
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The present rules approach transnational corporations from their parts, not from their
network19-though concepts of piercing the corporate veil TM and, in particular, of global
accounting concepts-indicate future trends: "The purpose of consolidated statements is
to present ... the results of operations and the financial position of a parent company and
its subsidiary essentially as if the group were a single company with one or more branches
and divisions."
7 I
But do we have network propositions elsewhere? An answer may be given by shareholder
activism-in particular through American investment funds-that aims at global corporate
governance standards." But that might be regarded as cultural hegemony and might pro-
voke unpredictable reactions or escape routes." There is little chance that a global economy
will accept "Delawarization" or a focus on shareholder value without concessions to local
stakeholders.14 Just consider the different views on the question of whether directors may
or may not have to consider the effects on constituents other than shareholders, for example,
labor as under the German codetermination concept," or the general public.7 6
D. CONTRACT AS SALVATION?
1. Delaware as an Example
Some authors propose contractual agreements for a solution.77 Indeed, the Delaware
approach can be explained as a deal between the state of Delaware and management; could
it be a pattern beyond the United States? Certainly, if only one state would structure the
corporate governance, conflicts of jurisdictions would not occur. The idea sounds great,
looks like a dens ex machina but is Delaware a success? Let's take it up again in this context:
Roberta Romano argues that shareholders have benefited from Delaware, that this system
"for the most part" maximizes shareholder value. But what constitutes "the most part"? Is
69. See Damien Considine, The Real Barriers to Regulation of Corporate Groups, 3 AsIA PAC. L. REV. 37 (1994).
70. See United States v. Bestfood, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); see also Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shop,
Inc., 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998); Johnson Enter. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290
(11 th Cit. 1998); United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cit. 1997), cert. granted. For a wider
view, see PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS (1985).
71. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 51, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
72. See Mary E. Kissane, Global Gadflies: Applications and Implements of U.S.-Style Corporate GovernanceAbroad,
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 621 (1997).
73. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ide-
ologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1998).
74. Joseph Auerbach, Corporate Ethics: An Elusive Euphemism, 5 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 179 (1997)
tells us about a recent recommendation to a corporate board: it "has a responsibility to: 'clearly define its role,
considering both its legal responsibilities to shareholders and the needs of other constituencies, provided share-
holders are not disadvantaged.' "Id.
75. See Jean du Plessis, Some Thoughts on the German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in
FESTSCHRIPT PUER BERNHARD GROSSFELD 875 (Ulrich Huebner & Werner F. Ebke eds., 1999); Bernhard Gross-
feld & Werner Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative View of Corporate Power in the United
States and Europe, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 397 (1978); Bernd Singhoff & Oliver Seiler, Shareholder Participation in
Corporate Decisionmaking under German Law: A Comparative Analysis, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493 (1998). For a
general overview, see Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
76. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIo ST. L.J.
515 (1984).
77. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OP AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Miller, supra note 65, at 70.
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there statistical evidence? The language pretends a mathematical precision that does not
exist in economics. Game theory and comparative law" have successfully attacked this con-
cept. The myth of mathematics is even faster withering away than the myth of law and
economics as a comprehensive approach. 79
2. Doubts
Given the deficiencies of "Delaware," the evidence for the social superiority of this con-
cept stands out. As we have seen, other authors express grave doubts and hint to the fact
that stock prices might not accurately reflect the corporation's value due to slack. 8° Also,
management can use internally generated funds and can thus avoid the equity market as a
message board." To sum up: there is no doubt that many corporations are "managerial
satrapies, '' s2 and management may have even captured the law-making and law-applying
institutions.83 It is now quite clear. Individual actions by mortal shareholders can never
challenge the power of immortal structures and of their masserts. The power of immortality
of interests and compound interests can only be kept at bay by other immortal powers
(investment funds) or by statistically relevant social movements (stock markets). Other ac-
tors are open to influence of management in the long run. As the adage goes, "Money has
a very small head and will pierce or circumvent every wall." Confronted with such powers,
there is also little hope from the legal profession. Corporate attorneys seldom challenge
managers that might have been acting against the interests of the corporation and its share-
holders; the going perception is that corporate attorneys should only serve managers. s4
What would happen when the stringent procedural and federal environment with its coun-
tervailing effect on laxity are exchanged against an enabling bargaining atmosphere? What
is one to expect if another liberal model would be put on top of an already existing liberal
model. Could that result in too much liberality-liberal for whom? Can the interactions
between two liberal models be kept under control; are they sufficiently transparent even
for the small guy? The questions indicate the answer: No!
IV. Securities Laws
A. AMERICAN FEDERAL LAW
Securities laws are an American invention, and stand for the genius of the American
corporation law,85 or for the side of state corporation laws given the vagaries of Delaware
-whatever view we prefer.s6 Thus, the United States was the original basis of operation
78. See Grossfeld, supra note 66.
79. See id.
80. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and
Securities Regulation, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 613, 678 (1987).
81. See id.
82. William H. Simon, What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate Managers Have Public Responsibilities,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1697 (1993).
83. See William B. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1460 (1993).
84. Cf Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, PC, 706 N.E.2d 491 (I1. 1998); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d
104 (Ill. 1991). But see Lincoln Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
85. See ROMANO, supra note 77. For Germany, see Marcus Lutter, Gesellschafcsrecht und Kapitlmarkf in
FESTSCHRIFT FUER WOLFGANG ZOELLNER 363 (Manfred Lieb et al. eds., 1998).
86. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistomology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organized
Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997).
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for securities laws, and soon extraterritoriality again became the name of the game! Here,
the loss of distance over the Internet has changed the picture dramatically. The distinction
between national and international transactions withers away.87 Transactions over the In-
ternet are difficult to locate and might have worldwide repercussions. Securities laws cannot
be defined anymore by concerts of territoriality. Following global markets, securities laws
reach international dimensions.88
The application of American securities laws met the new challenges with appropriate
speed. Originally, protection against conduct occurring outside the United States was only
granted when the conduct had an effect on the American securities market or on American
investors.89 A second avenue extended the American securities laws to acts and omissions
within the United States whose impact is felt outside the United States,9° thus granting the
pax americana to international investors. But the protection is still limited. The conduct
within the United States must form "a substantial part of the alleged fraud" and must be
"material to its success." 9' The application in a given case is bound to American interests.
It is governed by the expectation of reciprocity and by the desire to elevate the standard of
conduct in securities transactions in the United States. The purpose is to encourage Amer-
ican citizens to behave responsibly and to prevent the development of relaxed standards
that might spill over to American securities transactions.92 But the concrete answer is
"largely a policy decision"-and this limits the rule's international application and reli-
ability.93
B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS
The present limits for globally efficient regulations on global markets without distance
cry for cooperation-and this is tried within the framework of the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). It is a prime example for the fact that inter-
national cooperation proceeds apace in the securities field, and is blossoming among the
world's regulators. Small wonder. Countries with lax regulatory regimes may damage the
soundness and safety of financial markets with potentially catastrophic consequences world-
wide.
IOSCO is an intergovernmental substate organization with a special focus on securities
regulation.94 It is constituted by a private bill of the Quebec National Assembly and now
comprises 152 members of different status from ninety-one countries. IOSCO assembles
87. See A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 163 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1999); cf. Amir N. Licht,
Games Commissions Play: 2 x 2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 61 (1999).
88. See Gunnar Schuster, Ertraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis of Jurisdictional Conflicts,
26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165 (1994).
89. See MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 1990).
90. See id.
91. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1990). But see Paul Rogers, A Comment on the
Extraterritorial Application ofAmerican Law in the 1990's, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER BERNHARD GROSSFELD, supra note
75, at 901; Michael Wallace Gordon, United States Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Securities Fraud
Litigation, WIRTSCHAFTSPRUEFERKAMMER MITrEILUNGEN 145 (Special Issue June 1997).
92. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1977).
93. See Grunenthat GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76
F.3d 287 (9th Cir. 1996).
94. See Joel P. Trachtnan, Accounting Standards and Trade Disciplines: Irreconcilable Differences?, 31 J. WORLD
TRADE 63, 76 (1997).
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comparative information and issues recommendations for the harmonization and mutual
recognition of rules on disclosure and accountancy, the regulation of secondary markets,
and the regulation of market intermediaries. It aspires to achieve its goals through consensus
and cannot promulgate laws or treaties. 95 IOSCO works cooperatively with the Interna-
tional Accounting Standard Committee (IASC), which issues the International Accounting
Standards (LAS). 96
In its publication entitled "Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation," IOSCO
set forth thirty "principles of securities regulation,"97 based on three objectives: protection
of investors; ensurance of fair, efficient, and transparent markets; and reduction of systemic
risk. Key components are accounting and auditing standards, rules against the abuse of
insider information, and protection against the financial failure of market intermediaries.
C. INTERNET: TRYING TO BOARD A MOVING Bus9"
1. National Regulators
IOSCO has entered the virtual world with its document Securities Activity on the Internet,
referring to the Internet's "unprecedented immediacy, flexibility and interactivity," chal-
lenging "traditional notions of jurisdiction and territoriality."99 The network is ever-present,
recognizing neither geographic nor state borders. The loss of distance makes borders dis-
appear, endangers sovereign activities based on the concept of control over territory, and
throws even the concept of sovereignty itself into doubt. According to IOSCO, however,
this is not the end of geography: "Although Internet communications are not easily confined
to within national borders, national regulators remain responsible for protecting investors
in their jurisdictions. Each regulator must determine generally under what circumstances
Internet securities transactions, wherever originating, may be made available to investors
in their jurisdictions."''10
Regulators are, however, asked to provide guidance on the circumstances under which
they will exercise regulatory authority. They may impose regulatory requirements over
Internet activities that occur (what does this mean?) within their jurisdiction or if offshore
activities, in fact, have a significant effect upon residents or markets within their jurisdiction.
2. Factors to Be Considered
In doing so, regulators should examine the following factors (neither determinative nor
exclusive) in deciding whether to assert authority:
• Is the information clearly targeted to residents within the jurisdiction? Indications of
targeting may be local distribution networks, concurrent advertising or publicity
through other media in the jurisdiction, prices in local currency or communications in
95. See David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial
Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 281 (1998).
96. See infra Part I.D.
97. International Organization of Securities Commissions, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,
http://www.iosco.org/docs-publicl 198-objectives-document02.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2000).
98. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cit. 1997).
99. International Organization of Securities Commissions, Securities Activity on the Internet,
http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998-internet-security-document0l.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2000).
100. Id.
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local language (when that currency or language is not commonly used on a global
basis-American and Dollars as safe havens? The only ones?);
" Accepting purchases or providing services from or to residents in the jurisdiction unless
made under circumstances that exclude a public offering; and
" Use of e-mail or other media that push the information to residents in the jurisdic-
tion. 10
Factors operating against the assertion of authority may be:
" It is clearly stated to whom an offer is directed;
" The website lists up the jurisdictions in which the author is admitted to securities
activities; and
" Reasonable precautions are taken to prevent sales in the jurisdiction. Screening the
addresses of persons responding to the Internet offer could be an effective means. An
absence of reasonable precautions is indicated by a significant amount of unauthorized
sales.102
In any event, regulators should take enforcement actions whenever fraudulent or manipu-
lative activities place residents at risk.
3. Securities and Exchange Commission
The American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggests a number of steps
to avoid triggering U.S. securities laws. 10 3 Under the general approach of interpretation,
foreign offshore Internet offerors should post meaningful disclaimers on their websites and
should "implement measures that are reasonably designed to guard against sales or the
provision of [investment] services to U.S. persons."'- They should not send e-mail or direct
other offering-related communications to particular U.S. persons or groups. In the case of
simultaneous offshore Internet and U.S. exempt offerings by foreign issuers, these offerors
should not use their offshore Internet offerings to solicit investors for their private U.S.
offerings. By the same token, U.S. issuers have to take precaution when they make Internet
offshore offerings. They should password protect their websites to ensure that only non-
U.S. persons may obtain access. Underwriters should always look at the issuer's status to
determine what measures may be adequate to avoid targeting the United States.
Practice reacts with provisos like the following:
Any shares of ABB Ltd. (Switzerland) to be delivered in connection with the Exchange Offers
(... ) will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the Securities
Act), or under any relevant securities laws of any state of the United States. Accordingly, the
shares of ABB Ltd. may not be offered, sold or delivered within the United States except
pursuant to an exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements
of the Securities Act and otherwise in accordance with all applicable state securities laws.
The Exchange Offers have not been registered in Canada, Japan, or Australia and are not
being made directly or indirectly in Canada, Japan, or Australia. The shares to be issued
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Statement of the Commission, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,806 (Mar. 27, 1998).
104. See id. at 14,807-08.
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by ABB Ltd. pursuant to the Exchange Offers will not be registered in Canada, Japan, or
Australia and may not be offered, directly or indirectly, in Canada, Japan or, Australia.'0'
Words act as a wall against the real cross-border penetration over the Internet. In a virtual
world, words occupy the role of geography. Virtuality meets virtuality!
There is, however, reason for optimism. Securities are rather standardized assets to which
securities markets assimilate quite fast. The high level of abstraction facilitates common
views, as geographical idiosyncrasies normally do not interfere. In addition, the U.S. ex-
ample has already set the pattern in Europe, 0 6 in Germany, 07 and elsewhere, creating a
common frame of reference.
4. Personal Jurisdiction
So far, there is little experience with jurisdictional problems caused by the Internet. What
constitutes a sufficient contact?08 In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, the court held that
a website alone did not fulfill the requirements even of a long-arm statute.0 0 The operator
of the famous New York jazz club, "The Blue Note," in the heart of Greenwich Village,
sued Mr. King, the operator of the "The Blue Note" jazz club in Columbia, Missouri. King
marketed his nightclub on a website that could be clicked on in New York. The plaintiff
asked for protection for his registered trademark. The court was of the opinion that a
website alone did not constitute a presence in New York." 0
The decision, however, is restricted to a very particular situation that deserves mention.
The court realized that "attempting to apply established trademark law in the fast-devel-
oping world of the Internet is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus.""' Therefore,
the court emphasized the local setting from the outset:
Columbia, Missouri, is a small to medium size city far distant both physically and substantively
from Manhattan. It is principally a white-collar community, hosting among other institutions
Stephens College, Columbia College and the University of Missouri. It would appear to be an
ideal location for a small cabaret featuring live entertainment, and King, a Columbia resident,
undoubtedly found this to be so." 2
King originally added a disclaimer that his CyberSpot should not be confused with "one
of the world's finest jazz clubs, the Blue Note" located in Greenwich Village." 3 But he had
added a hyperlink that could be used to connect a reader's computer to a website maintained
by Bensusan. On Bensusan's objections, King removed the hyperlink and substituted the
following disclaimer:
105. ABB GRoup, PROSPECTUS, INTRODUCING THE ABB LTD. SINGLE-CLASS SHARE. EXCHANGE OFFER BY
ABB LTD TO THE SHAREHOLDERS OF ABB AB AND ABB AG. (1999).
106. See Council Directive 89/592, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989 OJ. (L 334) 30.
107. See Peter M. Memminger, The New German Insider Law: Introduction and Discussion in Relation to the
U.S. Securities Law, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 189 (1996).
108. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
109. See Benssan Rest. Corp., 126 F.3d at 25.
110. For the question of whether a domain on a website violates a trademark, see Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 640 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The court regards websites mainly as addresses,
not as trademarks.
111. Bensusan Rest. Corp., 126 F.3d at 27.
112. Seeid. at26.
113. Id. at 27.
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The Blue Note, Columbia, Missouri should not be confused in any way, shape, or form with
Blue Note Records or the jazz club, Blue Note, located in New York. The CyberSpot is created
to provide information for Columbia, Missouri area individuals only, any other assumptions
are purely coincidental.l4
From this introduction to the facts, the result followed. There were no substantial rev-
enues derived from interstate commerce, a requirement that "is intended to exclude non-
domiciliaries whose business operations are of a local character."' "King's 'Blue Note' cafe
was unquestionably a local operation."'  The virtual loss of distance was reconstituted by
a virtual distance created through a wall of words! Can we trust them?" I Even virtual signs
have real impacts and cannot be erased by virtuality. Power of the Internet!
D. CONTRACT AS SALVATION?
The advocates of contract as salvation also advertise this solution for international securities
transactions."8 Foreign issuers selling shares in the United States could then opt out of federal
securities laws and choose those of another nation. They may choose their country of incor-
poration or another U.S. state to govern their transactions in the United States. By the same
token, U.S. securities laws would not apply to transactions by U.S. investors abroad in the
shares of firms that opted for a non-U.S. securities domicile. Consequently, U.S. law would
apply only to corporations affirmatively choosing to be governed by U.S. law, whether they
are U.S.- or non-U.S.-based firms."' And what happens if they do not?
Here again, the proposal gets another turn when it comes to the international scenario
as all corporate law questions receive a more intensive color in cross-border transactions.
As we have seen,12°the balancing-out effect of internal transactions is missing and puts limits
on international liberality. What is lost is normally lost forever.
In addition, securities laws are modeled along particular corporation's laws, not only by
language, but also by spirit. A normative mix of rules from different jurisdictions might
amount to a new form of lottery when the concepts cannot be easily matched. The loss of
transparency for the small investor is apparent and increases his transaction costs for finding
out far beyond any national transaction. Are there lawyers around that can tell him how it
fits together? Consider only mastering two or three languages-given the fact that words




Given the loss of distance, national rules of accounting lose their "sovereign" shelter
and-even more important-change their functions. In particular, in Europe they were
114. Id.
115. Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted).
116. See id.
117. Cf Bernhard Grossfeld & Markus Huelper, Analpbabetismus in Zivilrecbt, 9 JURISTENZEITUNG 430
(1999).
118. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE LJ.
2359 (1998).
119. See id. at 2362.
120. See supra Part IV.C.2.
121. See Grossfeld, supra note 66 and accompanying text.
122. See BERNHARD GROSSFELD, BILANZRECHT (2d ed. 1997); PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, UNDERSTANDING
gAS: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (1999).
FALL 2000
980 THE EI4TERNATIONAL LAWYER
mostly regarded as constituting an important part of microeconomics; they were treated as
being important for the presentation of individual firms to banks and other individual cred-
itors. Their aspect of marketing the corporation on financial markets was neglected: on
isolated national markets it was sufficient to rely on the professional knowledge of an elite
national circle. This has changed dramatically. Global markets do not rely on national elites,
but rather on the compound power of a huge number of anonymous actors moving their
money around the world at the tip of their fingers. Given the strength of this global market,
firms must be able to attract part of this freewheeling capital at the lowest possible interest
rates. Because of the extraordinary, magical power of interest and compound interest over
time (seventy-two divided by the interest rate roughly shows the numbers of years in which
debt doubles2'), a firm cannot survive against more cheaply financed competitors.
That is why accounting, too, has changed its character. It has become a macroeconomic
instrument of the greatest proportion acting speedily and brutally. Rules of accounting
channel the flow of money around the world, directing capital towards the most beautiful
and most trustworthy bidder and withdrawing it from the less fortunate. Rules of accounting
are the most important money agents. Lawyers, traditionally not trained in market concepts,
tend to neglect these dynamic aspects of accounting. But the closeness to money and to
money transactions puts accounting into the centerplace of a global economy giving ac-
countants a competitive edge over lawyers-a growing matter of concern for the legal
profession. Two semiotic information systems (the Internet and accounting) join forces and
support each other in geometrical proportions. They are both information products and
pure know-how-energy. Their very essence is not physical appearance but the information
that they convey across all national borders. Sovereignty based on control over know-how
and on the power to channel it through law has no chance anymore; the censorship exerted
by keeping rules of accounting within the national frame in favor of the national profession
(the happy few) is broken by an international communication society for which lawyers
(with their traditionally domestic instincts) are badly prepared. Working together, these
new energy bundles drive to new proportions the ability of money to whirl from one place
to another, to move from purpose to purpose.1 4 Accounting rules even create "acquisition
currencies." A corporation that wants to swap shares in the United States, for instance, has
first to create its share-currency on Wall Street by using the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP).
B. DIVERSITY
Unfortunately, accounting rules continue to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 2 s due
to history and path-dependency.126 The present state of things is well expressed in a state-
ment of the International Accounting Standards Board:'
123. Assume that a particular investment earns ten percent a year. The investment will then increase in value
by 2.5 times after ten years, almost seven times after twenty years, over seventeen times after thirty years, and
by forty-five times after forty years. See Note, Five Strategies to Increase Retirement Savings, PARTICIPANT 8, 9
(MAY 1999).
124. See O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 7.
125. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Accounting, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 235 (1993).
126. See Masao KishidaJapanese LegalAccounting System, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER BERNHARD GROssELDsupra
note 75, at 569.
127. International Accounting Standards Committee, LAS 32: Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presenta-
tion, available at http://www.iasc.org.uk/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2000).
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Financial statements are prepared and presented for external users by many enterprises around
the world. Although such financial statements may appear similar from country to country,
there are differences, which have probably been caused by a variety of social, economic, and
legal circumstances and by different countries having in mind the needs of different users of
financial statements when setting national requirements.
These different circumstances have led to the use of a variety of definitions of the elements
of financial statements; that is: for example, assets, liabilities, equity, income and expenses.
They have also resulted in the use of different criteria for the recognition of items in the
financial statements and in a preference for different bases of measurement. The scope of the
financial statements and the disclosures made in them have also been affected.
2 8
C. GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
1. Character
Given the fact that New York and Wall Street are the financial centers of the world, the
GAAP-maintained by the Accounting Standards Board, a private professional body under
the loose supervision of the SEC-could become a kind of world standard. 12 9 They are the
only access road to Wall Street for firms that want to be traded there. The desire is moti-
vated by three factors: trading in a wider area might increase the value of their shares; it
enhances their name recognition in the United States and serves as a marketing device for
products; and it creates a new currency as already mentioned. This latter aspect is often
decisive.
But the GAAP are not easily used outside their birthplace. The limited exportability is
part of their very nature, which the Supreme Court of California described as follows:
The GAAP are an amalgam of statements issued by the AICPA through the successive groups
it has established to promulgate accounting principles: the Committee on Accounting Proce-
dure, the Accounting Principles Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Like
GAAS, GAAP include broad statements of accounting principles amounting to aspirational
norms as well as more specific guidelines and illustrations. The lack of an official compilation
allows for some debate over whether particular announcements are encompassed within GAAP.
One standard text purporting to comprehensively restate GAAP includes 90 major sections
and more than 500 pages. 3 °
Add to this their flexibility, their undeterminacy, and we arrive at a very complex situation.
It is this complexity that gives the American profession a virtual monopoly on interpretation
and application. Claus Luttermann calls the GAAP a "patchwork"' and refers to the "def-
inition mess,"'32 receiving their meaning largely from the unwritten American environment:
"Generally accepted accounting principles are conventional-that is, they become generally
accepted by agreement (often tacit agreement) rather than by formal derivation from a set
of postulates or basic concepts. The principles have developed on the basis of experience,
reason, custom, usage, and, to a significant extent, practical necessity."' 3 3 The difference to
European traditions of interpretation is apparent.
128. Id. For the history, see Grossfeld, supra note 125.
129. See JENs WUESTEMANN, GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (1999).
130. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750-51 (Cal. 1992).
131. CLAus LU-rrERMANN, UNTERNEiiMEN, KAPITAL UND GENUSSRECHTE 407 (1998).
132. Id. at 407 n.228.
133. GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, APB Statement No. 4, § 139 (1972).
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2. Doubts
We run into problems similar to those with "Delaware"-but on the international level-
from the very beginning and without the balancing factors that persist in a national setting.
The flexibility and the perplexing patchwork compilation of the GAAP "guaranty" and
"indeterminacy" even beyond "Delaware;" the language advantage strengthens the position
of the American happy few. This gives the United States a virtual monopoly in the inter-
pretation, not to be matched by other countries that will retain a junior status. This stirs
up bad memories as they are, for instance, felt in India. There it is said that the indeter-
minacy of the Common Law was deadly for the colonized, but a resource for the Empire.
Will there be a new Empire in accounting run by a small national group? Career prospects
for native English speakers, for people trained in the United States, and for law or business
schools there look brilliant. There is also the risk that accountants' liability will be governed
by U.S.-influenced standards, which do not necessarily take into account the "offshore view
of the world" and the "what is done and what is not done" abroad. The "client-controlled
environment[s]" of the audits' 14 may be dramatically different. American courts will find
ways to exert jurisdiction,'-a sufficient genuine link could be the apparent Americanness
and the greater experience with rules from the United States.136
D. INTERNATIONAL AcCOUNi ING STANDARDS
1. Character
The IAS are an attempt to overcome these shortcomings and to prevent an American
dominance of the profession.' They are the work of the IASC, an independent, private-
sector body in London, England that was formed in 1973 by professional accountancy
bodies from the Western world. It now includes all the members of the International Fed-
eration of Accountants (IFAC) from ninety-one countries. The aim is to achieve uniformity
in accounting principles for financial reporting around the world. 3' Its objectives are:
(a) to formulate and publish in the public interest accounting standards to be observed in the
presentation of financial statements and to promote their worldwide acceptance and obser-
vance, and (b) to work generally for the improvement and harmonization of regulations, ac-
counting standards, and procedures relating to the presentation of financial statements. 3'
The IOSCO 14 is looking to the IASC to provide mutually acceptable IAS for use in
multi-national securities offerings and other international offerings. The approved text is
published in English. Members may issue translations in the languages of their country, but
135. Cf. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse, LLP, 988 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); First Am. Corp. v.
Price Waterhouse, LLP, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cit. 1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, National Jurisdiction and theMul-
tinational Enterprise, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 81 (Andreas F. Low-
enfeld ed., 1996); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Suing a Multinational Enterprise, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION 202 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld ed., 1993).
134. Bily, 843 P.2d at 763.
136. See Paul Carrington, Moths to the Light: The Dubious Attractions of American Law, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER
BERNHARD GROSSFELD, supra note 75, at 129.
137. See CURRENT STANDARDS, INTERNATIONAL AcCOUtrING STANDARDS (International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee 1998).
138. See Alexander Bardenz, Von Deutscher zu Internationaler Rechnungslegung-HGB und IAS (1997)
(unpublished dissertation, Munster Universitat) (on file with Munster Universitat Library).
139. Trachtman, supra note 94, at 78.
140. See infra Part D.2.
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it must be indicated that it is a translation of the approved text. The work is in progress;
there are currently thirty-two international accounting standards. A number of countries
already require or allow to present financial standards in accordance with the AS, for
example, section 292a of the German Commercial Code for group accounts if the shares
are traded on foreign exchanges.
14 1
It is, however, unclear whether the LAS will facilitate access to the U.S. market, as the
SEC expressed reservations in view of the fact that the LAS must measure up to the GAAP.
The SEC is also concerned about the fact that the interpretation of the IAS might vary
from one state to another. Without a centralized authority for definitive interpretation the
standards will soon diverge.
2. European Commission
The European Commission sees the urgency of the problems and the inherent danger
of American dominance and attaches much importance to accounting as a tool for a proper
functioning of international markets. 141 It puts its weight behind the LAS, in particular with
regard to group accounts. The Commission clearly favors the LAS over the GAAP.143 The
Commission believes that only the LAS produce results, which have a clear prospect of
international recognition within a not-too -distant future. It takes a firm stand against the
adoption of American standards even as an interim measure. "American standards are de-
veloped without any European input. They are designed to satisfy the needs of the American
capital market and are not necessarily suitable in a European context."'
44
By the same token, the Commission discourages European enterprises to prepare finan-
cial statements on the basis of the GAAP, as it makes it more difficult to come to terms
between the ASC and the IOSCO. There is also, quite rightly, concern for job opportu-
nities as already mentioned above. If American standards prevail, the American profession
and American-trained accountants will command a considerable competitive advantage, and
the Europeans fear "that appetite more than ideals" might dominate the process. 145 The
relative strength of financial centers will decide the outcome: Markets make law. Will Wall
Street continue to be far ahead of the crowd, or will an alliance of Frankfurt, London, and
Paris rise to competitive status? Insofar, geography is not outdated even in, and for, a virtual
environment.
E. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
1. Language Barriers'4"
Standards of accounting are two different languages and can, therefore, act as trade bar-
riers. 14 The subject of language as a trade barrier has seldom been discussed; though it is
141. Cf. Martin Henssler, Minderheitenschutz im faktischen GmbH-Konzern-Zugeich ein Plaedoyerffuer die
Aufwertung des Konzernabschlusses, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER WOLFGANG ZOELLNER, supra note 85, at 203.
142. Cf. Case C-234/94, Waltraud Tomberger v. Gebrueder von der Wettern GmbH, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3133.
143. See Susan Binns, The EU-Commission's Strategy with Respect to Accounting and Disclosure, in INsTITur DER
WIRTSCHAFTSPROFER, WELTWEITE RECNUNGSLEGUNG UND PROFUNG 35 (1998).
144. Id. at 36.
145. Paul B. Stephan, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 MA.
U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 745, 767 (1995).
146. See Claus Luttermann, Dialog der Kulturen: Vergleichendes Handels- und Kapitalmarkrecht im Sprachspie-
gel, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER BERNHARD GROSSFELD, supra note 75, at 771.
147. Cf Jack A. Hiller, Law, Language, Creativity and the Divided Brain: Are We Producing Half-Brained
Lawyers?, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER BERNHARD GROSSFELD, supra note 75, at 365.
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of major importance within the European Union. Here, the French language legislation
(specifically the Bas-Lauriol Law and the Toubon Law) is the starting point of the discus-
sion. 4
s
The arguments begin with the assumption that states are inclined to enact protectionist
measures to reassert their regulatory autonomy against cultural invasions, and that such
legislation violates the principles of free movement of goods within the European Union.
As language is a prime social glue, it is not surprising that governments try to use language
as an instrument to protect national, cultural, and economic identities. The impact on
economic movements is the stronger as-so far-little attention has been devoted to these
effects and, thus, little control is exerted.
A closer look shows that different rules of accounting restrict cross-border trade and
services in securities. The New York Stock Exchange, for instance, requires that the com-
panies' accounts follow the GAAP. Thus, shares presented under a different "name" (e.g.,
IAS) cannot be traded there. By the same token, foreign issuers seeking to enhance their
name recognition in the United States lose a very important marketing tool. Thus, different
rules of accounting constitute a direct barrier for the free flow of goods.
In addition, diverse accounting standards present a severe obstacle for cross-border ser-
vices. They affect the activities of at least three industries: accounting, financial and legal
services, and stock exchanges. Foreign accounting firms cannot provide competitive services
in a domestic accounting system. If at all, they will have to develop additional expertise and
to obtain licensing. The same is true for law firms.
2. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
a. Applicability
Joel P. Trachtman has discussed these problems in the context of the VTO-in particular
with regard to services. 49 The WTO aims to "provide the common institutional framework
for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements
and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes."' 50 Of course, the General Agree-
ment (GATT 1994) does not apply to services of any kind, including financial services. It
could be argued, however, that a prospectus containing financial statements is a good and
that a prospectus, therefore, is covered by GATT and, in particular, by the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Agreement). But the common understanding seems
to be that neither GATT nor the Standards Agreement were intended to govern financial
disclosure regulation.'' In addition, the Standards Agreement (included in Annex 1A to
the Final Act) excludes services standards from its coverage; they were thought to be too
heterogeneous for the application of general disciplines on standards-setting.I
Thus, only GATS is left to scrutinize measures by Member States that affect trade in
services. It includes under Article 1(2):
148. See Stacy Amity Feld, Language and the Globalization of the Economic Market: The Regulation of Language
asa Barrier to Free Trade, 31 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153 (1998).
149. See Trachtman, supra note 94.
150. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 LL.M. 1125, 1144.
151. See Trachtman, supra note 94, at 79.
152. See id.
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" Cross-border trade, where the provider is located in the territory of one member and
provides the services into the territory of another member;
" Cross-border trade, where the service consumer travels to the territory of the member
in which the service provider is located;
" A service supplier of one member that establishes a commercial presence in the territory
of another member; and
" The presence of natural persons of a member to provide services in the territory of
another member. I"3
The GATS Annex on Financial Services states explicitly that it "applies to measures
affecting the supply of financial services." 4 It sounds like a reasonable interpretation to
assume that the regulations for accounting fall under this category.1l5
b. Operating Provisions
Article VI of GATS provides the operating discipline; it covers sectors in which specific
commitments have been undertaken and requires reasonable, objective, and impartial ad-
ministration of all measures of general application. For our purposes, article VI is in point:
"Members] shall not apply licensing and qualification requirements and technical standards
that nullify or impair such specific commitment in a manner" that is "more burdensome
than necessary to ensure the quality of the service" and "could not reasonably have been
expected of that Member at the time the specific commitments in those sectors were
made."' 16 Thus, "proportionality" and "reasonable expectations" have to be discussed. So
far the chances for an attack on the GAAP seem to be slim."' But the loss of distance and
the rise of the IAS may improve the "off-shore" chances.
VI. Bankruptcy58
A. PART OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The emphasis on shareholder value has neglected another crucial component of corpo-
rate governance: corporate bankruptcy; s9 both institutions dynamically interact with each
other. The feeling for this connection has always been strong in continental Europe, where
banks were the driving forces behind the first corporation statutes,' 60 and where the rules
of accounting were designed to protect banks in their position as prime lenders. 161 It is this
marriage between banks and corporations' 62 that explains to a large extent the more strin-
153. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1168, 1169.
154. Id. at 1189.
155. See Trachtman, supra note 94, at 81.
156. GATS, supra note 153, at 1173.
157. See Trachtman, supra note 94, at 96.
158. See generally Evan D. Flashen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, TEx.
INT'L L.J. 587 (1998); Lauren D. Rosenthal,Rule I 0b-5 and Tranmational Bankruptcies: Whose Law ShouldApply?,
61 FORDHAM L. REv. S321 (1993).
159. See David A. Skeel Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1324 (1998).
160. See KJaus Hopt, Ideelle und wirtschaftliche Grundlagen der Aktien-, Bank- und Boersenrechtsentwicklung im
19. Jahrhundert, in WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION DES PRIVATRECHTS IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 128 (Helmut
Coing & Walter Wilhelm eds., 1980).
161. See Grossfeld, supra note 125.
162. See Skeel, supra note 159, at 1383.
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gent requirements in European corporation laws and the love for silent (not hidden) re-
serves in the balance sheets; it also explains the antipathy against "Delaware."
It is also clear that the different theories on when and to what extent to pierce the
corporate veil have much to do with the question of whether a single illiquidity can launch
an avalanche of liability. Are there bankruptcy rules that work as a bulwark of last resort to
stop the avalanche somewhere? Otherwise, the avalanche might destroy vast going-concern
values, ruin the whole corporate group, and cause a social disaster with unforeseeable costs
to the public-in particular, during an industrial downturn. In this way, liberal or stringent
corporate rules, concepts of piercing, and accounting interact with and complement each
other.163 The trend to higher, even to market values, in international accounting will in-
evitably affect the emergence of corporate reorganization procedures in bankruptcy laws.
David A. Skeel makes the point that we can only understand how corporate governance
operates when we again learn to understand the complementary relationship between cor-
porate law and corporate bankruptcy.164 He advocates a new political account of corporate
law taking into account that a firm's approach to corporate law "is integrally related to the
nature of the corresponding bankruptcy regime," 165 which he sees as the "crucial missing
piece in understanding corporate governance." 66
The same follows from the internationalization of markets. Growing exposures to risks
abroad (often hardly foreseeable) trigger a transfer of national wealth into another country
from where it might never come, back. Insofar, internal liability and cross-border liability
do not stand on equal levels. Also, foreign courts might be tempted to use their long arms
for a kind of carpet bagging abroad. Bankruptcy laws have to take care of these differences
and temptations. Only through an adaptive evolution may corporate governance patterns
stay stable despite the constraints of global markets.
B. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Given these interdependencies, a real international bankruptcy law has few, if any, chances
although the need for it is particularly urgent. The insolvency or the reorganization of a
transnational corporation presents some of the most vexing situations. All of a sudden the
unitary structure of the corporation in financial difficulties is compartmentalized. Uncon-
nected national authorities all deal with often overlapping parts, and they follow a variety
of separate and sometimes conflicting interests.
In the event of a financial failure of a transnational corporation, the "rosy" concept of
globalization turns upside down changing the picture dramatically. The "relocalization" of
administration to various jurisdictions impedes normal corporate transactions, and might
bring them to a dramatic stop. A myriad conflict of law issues arise. "Indeed, an outside
observer of the current international regime for insolvencies might quickly conclude that
is was structured to promote, rather than prevent, financial failures and liquidations."' 67
163. See BERNHARD GROSSFELD, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, UNTERNEHMENSKONZENTRATION UND KLEINAKTION-
AER (1968).
164. Skeel, supra note 161, at 1324.
165. Id. at 1329.
166. Id. at 1350.
167. Bruce Leonard, Managing Default by a Multinational Venture: Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 33
TEX. INT'L LJ. 543 (1998).
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Historically, governments have shown little attention to improve the situation. Today the
best prospect seems to be the cooperation among national states. This demands globally
concerted actions. 68
C. CASES
In Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Socifti Generale,169 the Federal Court of Appeals
pleaded for a national restraint and held that the principles of international comity coun-
seled against applying the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance provisions internation-
ally. But In re Simon 7° is a perfect example for the continuing complexities of the present
situation. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. is an international banking company
incorporated in Hong Kong. It had extended a loan to Odyssey International Holdings,
Ltd. Odyssey is an international company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands; it
maintains offices in Hong Kong. Simon was Odyssey' s major shareholder and lived in and
operated his company from Hong Kong; he guaranteed the loan. The guarantee was to be
enforced under the law of Hong Kong and the jurisdiction of the courts in Hong Kong
was agreed upon.
Simon then traveled to the United States and filed a personal bankruptcy under Chapter
7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Hong Kong and Shanghai participated in the proceedings.
In his bankruptcy schedules Simon listed the guarantee as an obligation. The bankruptcy
court granted him a discharge of all debts and issued the following injunction: "All creditors
whose debts are discharged by this order ... are enjoined from instituting or continuing
any action or continuing any action or employing any process or engaging in any act to
collect such debts as personal liabilities of the above-named debtor."'171
Unconvinced, Hong Kong and Shanghai sought a declaratory judgment from the bank-
ruptcy court that the discharge and the injunction were not enforceable outside the United
States, and that Hong Kong and Shanghai could commence collection proceedings in Hong
Kong. The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint and the Federal Court of Appeals
affirmed:
Thus, under the bankruptcy code, the bankruptcy court must consider the status and progress
of other nations' insolvency proceedings in determining how to manage domestic bankruptcies.
In most cases the court will defer to where the "center of gravity" of multiple proceedings
exists, if one can be ascertained. However, courts may also proceed jointly with a foreign court
... or may choose to exercise its power to the full extent of its jurisdiction in an appropriate
case. 7'
The court distinguished Maxwell as follows:
Maxwell involved an international insolvency jointly managed in the United States and Great
Britain. A true conflict existed between the preference law of Great Britain and the United
States which would have produced a different result depending on which law applied. Because
168. See id.
169. Maxwell Comm. Corp. v. Soci&t Generale, 93 F.3d 1036, 1050 (2d Cir. 1996); see Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communications, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (1996).
170. In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v.
Simon, 119 S. Ct. 1032 (1999).
171. Id. at 994.
172. Id. at 999.
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the pre-petition transactions occurred solely in Great Britain, the Maxwell court appropriately
exercised its discretion to defer in the interest of international Comity.
By contrast, this case does not involve competing bankruptcy proceedings; indeed, there is
no proceeding pending in Hong Kong. The sole, plenary insolvency proceeding was initiated
in the United States without objection and with the participation of the appellant. Hong Kong-
Shanghai cannot point to a single conflict which exists between Hong Kong and the United
States law on the issue in question. In fact, the section 524 discharge injunction does not apply
to the Hong Kong courts at all, but only to the creditor who enjoyed the benefits of partici-
pating in the United States bankruptcy.'73
In In re Simon, the court of appeals held that the Bankruptcy Code provides for a flexible
approach in international insolvencies. The courts have to take into account foreign pro-
ceedings and, as a matter of last resort, have to apply the American law extraterritorially in
the interest of creditors and the debtor. But notwithstanding all the talk about comity and
cooperation, the hard core lies elsewhere and pretends to be geographic (in words!):
The court's exercise of "custody" over the debtor's property, via its exercise of in rem juris-
diction, essentially creates a fiction that the property-regardless of actual location-is legally
located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the district in which the court sits... . This
includes property outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."14
Therefore, Judge Hall concurred stating: "Congressional intent may be less than clear, but
it is clear that bankruptcy estate property is located within the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion."'17
5
He did not see "that territoriality is implicated in this case."' 17 6 Fiction over fact-the
beginning or the end of geography? What does "geography" mean?
D. PROPOSALS
Limited legislative attempts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia
177
into the area of cooperation have only been used infrequently. More successful were at-
tempts by the International Bar Association with its Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat
in 1996. It refers to cooperation and coordination and suggests the harmonization of con-
flicting interest in a spirit of comity.
The Concordat met its practical test in the Everfresh Beverages case." 8 A Delaware cor-
poration with its headquarters in Chicago went bankrupt. It had operations in the United
States and Canada. The initiation of a reorganization proceeding in the United States
seemed to be meaningful only when the Canadian courts were willing to recognize it.
Otherwise, creditors involved in the Canadian portion of the business could have attacked
the structure put in place in the United States, notwithstanding the worldwide application
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code."19 Not being subject to the jurisdiction of the American court,
these creditors could have seized the company's assets in Canada. The solution found was
173. Id.
174. Id. at 996.
175. Id. at 999.
176. Id.
177. See Leonard, supra note 167.
178. In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc., 238 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
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a parallel reorganization procedure in Canada. The American judge and his Canadian col-
league both directed the company and its creditors to coordinate the bankruptcy proceed-
ings in the other country.18 0 Both judges approved the Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol
on the same day.
E. COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS 1 8'
Various attempts have been made to arrive at transnational legislative solutions. The
European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings'82 encouraged wider-reaching so-
lutions.'83 Very significant is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency that
was adopted in 1997.'14 Most important are articles 15 through 24, which address the
recognition of foreign proceedings and the relief granted thereunder. Though it will take
time to invade national statutes, the model law offers some guidance in arriving at fair
treatment and achieving some degree of uniformity.
F. CONTRACT AS SALVATION?
Contract as salvation is also proposed for bankruptcy.8 ' But here additional doubts arise.
Does it benefit small creditors without a legal department or without a Wall Street firm
connection? Are these creditors sufficiently informed to make a reasonable choice? Will
they have enough bargaining power to assert their interests? What about their position in
a particular jurisdiction when all of a sudden this jurisdiction becomes attractive for out-
of-state or even offshore creditors? Will local creditors be able to compete with them? Will
local authorities start to compete for the favor of strong creditors or strong debtors? The
belief in the justice of contract is based on particular concepts of economic homogeneity,
which we cannot take for granted-particularly on the international scene. The justice of
contract is also based on the assumption of similarly "culturally imprinted" partners-but
this similarity cannot be expected internationally.
VII. International Mergers
A. DAIMLER/CHRYSLER6
The loss of distance and the reduction of coordination costs encourage and facilitate
transborder mergers. This is one of the main reasons why the need to find new avenues
180. See Leonard, supra note 167, at 549.
181. See John A. Barrett, Various Legislative Attempts with Respect to Bankruptcies Involving More Than One
Country, 33 TEX. INT'L LJ. 557 (1998).
182. Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1223.
183. See Barrett, supra note 181.
184. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (Oct. 20,
1997), at http://www.nbrc.gov/reporttitleg.html;see Barrett, supra note 181.
185. See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankrupty, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998).
186. See Theodor Baums, Verschmelzung mit Hilfe von Tochtergesellschaften, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER WOLFGANG
ZOELLNER, supra note 85, at 65; Theodor Baums, Corporate ContractingAroundDefective Regulations: The Daimler-
Chrysler Case, 155 J. INSTITrrlONTAL & THEOR. ECON. 119 (1999); Thomas P. O'Toole, The Long Arm of the
Law-European Merger Regulation and Its Application to the Merger of Boeing & McDonnell Douglas, 11 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 203 (1998).
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and bridges is not only felt by governments but also by corporate actors themselves. The
growing number of cross-border mergers or quasi-mergers shows this clearly; they are
prime examples for how contractual arrangements and clever adaptations may bring dif-
ferent corporate cultures together. Today the industry standard is set by the Daim-
ler/Chrysler business combination; it was structured along particular conflict-of-laws
rules"87 and particular accounting rules for mergers.8 8 The transaction received its char-
acteristic color by the fact that "two fundamentally different legal systems" had to be linked
with each other.Y9
B. CONFLICT OF LAWS
The problems started with the German conflict-of-laws rules on transnational mergers
under the seat theory. 90 They prevent a direct cross-border merger whereby Chrysler Cor-
poration merged directly into DaimlerChrysler AG (transfer of all the assets). Accordingly,
the German Transformation Act only provides for domestic mergers and not cross-border
mergers."' This restrictive approach is motivated by two concerns: if a foreign corporation
merges into a German corporation, it transfers its debts to the newly combined firm. But
can the exact amount of the debts be found out? Are the foreign balance sheets reliable;
are all risks taken into account? What about risks Germans are not or not to the same extent
familiar with, for example, product liability and punitive damages? Similar problems arise
with regard to accounts receivable: is the debtor's position comparable to what Germans
have in mind when they use the term "debt"? Are there substantially different modes of
execution; are there different reorganization procedures or more shelters for debtors? Add
to these concerns some technical aspects: merging two companies is an intricate matter
anyhow; it might run out of proportions when the corporate structures are difficult to
compare.
C. MERGER ACCOUNTING
However, the issue that stands out is the accounting aspect. Daimler-Benz AG had already
changed over to the GAAP to create an "acquisition currency" in the United States. 192
Therefore, the merger could be handled according to American accounting rules. The clues
were the rules on merger accounting (accounting for business combinations).'19
In a business combination, corporations are brought together into an accounting unity
that carries on the activities of the previously separate, independent corporations. For such
transactions, two methods of accounting are available: "purchase" and "pooling of inter-
ests." Both are acceptable, though not as alternatives for the same business combination;
187. See supra Part IV.B.1.
188. See supra Part V.C.I. and infra Part VII.C.
189. Joint Report of the Management Boards of Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft and DaimlerChryslerAG
regarding the Business Combination of Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft and the Chrysler Corporation into
DaimlerChrysler AG 36 (Aug. 6, 1998), available at http:www.daimler-benz.comind-gfnav-e.html?/
categor/news/text/80806a-e.htm [hereinafter Joint Report].
190. See supra Part n.B.1.
191. See Bernhard Grossfeld, lnternationales Umwandlungsrecht, DIE AXTIENGESELLSCHAFT (AG) 302 (1996).
192. See mpra Part V.A.
193. See Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 16: Business Combinations (1970).
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the choice depends on specific conditions. The pooling of interests method is required
when specified conditions are met, in particular, with regard to the exchange of shares. In
this case, the assets and the liabilities of the corporation are combined at their recorded
values, a new basis of accounting is not allowed, and no position for goodwill arises.
If these requirements are not met, then the business corporation is treated as an acqui-
sition of one or more companies under the purchasing method. The cost to the acquiring
corporation will be allocated to identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed based on
their fair values; the unallocated cost will be carried on as goodwill and will be written off
over forty years.
D. POOLING OF INTERESTS
The pooling of interests method applies when two or more companies combine by the
exchange of equity securities (merger of equals). The transaction is not seen as an acquisition
because it is accomplished without disbursing resources of the constituents. The ownership
interests continue and the former basis of accounting is retained; the assets and liabilities
are carried forward at their recorded amounts. Most combinations today are structured as
pooling of interests profits. This avoids a goodwill position (in this case, about DM 54
billion, and a write-off over forty years that would diminish future profits). Power of ac-
counting as a language!
The significantly different results of applying the purchase and pooling of interests methods
of accounting to a combination effected by an exchange of stock stem from distinct views of
the nature of the transaction itself. Those who endorse the pooling of interests method believe
that an exchange of stock to effect a business combination is in substance a transaction between
the combining stockholder groups and does not involve the corporate entities. The transactions
therefore neither requires nor justifies establishing a new basis of accountability for the assets
of the combined corporation. Those who endorse the purchase method believe that the trans-
action is an issue of stock by a corporation for consideration received from those who become
stockholders by the transaction. The consideration received is established by bargaining be-
tween independent parties, and the acquiring corporation accounts for the additional assets at
their bargained-that is, current-values.Y4
Based on this concept, the combining of existing voting common stock is the essence of
a business combination under the pooling of interests method: "The separate stockholder
interests lose their identities and all shares mutually in the combined risks and rights."'' 9
This idea of mutual sharing (merger of equals) governs the particular details. It is incom-
patible with this concept that the exchange of stock alters relative voting rights resulting in
preferential claims for some stockholders, or that significant minority interests continue to
exist. The acquiring corporation must offer and issue common stock with rights identical
to those of the majority of its outstanding voting common stock. This stock is to be ex-
changed for substantially all of the voting common stock interest of the other corporation;
substantially all of the voting common stock means ninety percent or more.196
Presently, the rule is under close scrutiny and stricter limits or even a ban on the use of
the method is discussed. The critical issue is that the method might not sufficiently disclose
194. Id. § 16.
195. Id. § 47.
196. See id.
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to shareholders the real costs of the transactions (the costs for the good will that have to
be depreciated over time). The SAB is considering whether to allow pooling only for a
small number of cases where two corporations of equal size decide to merge: "The board
will discuss whether the rule can be written in a way that would prevent companies of
unequal sizes from finding ways to squeeze through loopholes so that they can still use
pooling accounting." 97
E. STRUCTURE OF THE MERGER
The actual structure of the Daimler-Benz/Chrysler merger followed exactly these guide-
lines. It depended vitally on the application of the GAAP and their pooling rules. It is a
prime example for the overwhelming power of accounting on corporate transactions, a
power that is beyond the recognition of most lawyers.
Instead of a direct cross-merger, the first stage was entered with setting up the
DaimlerChrysler AG in Germany, the corporate structure of which duplicates that of the
Daimler-Benz AG. Then the DaimlerChrysler AG submitted to the Daimler-Benz share-
holders an offer to exchange their shares for the issuance of new DaimlerChrysler shares
(capital increase by way of contribution in kind, "Daimler-Benz Capital Increase"). Con-
sequently, the Daimler-Benz AG became a subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler AG. Concur-
rently, the entire interest in the Chrysler Corporation was exchanged for the issuance of
further new shares in the DaimlerChrysler AG (capital increase by way of contribution in
kind, "Chrysler Capital Increase"). The Chrysler shares had before been acquired by a U.S.
exchange agent expressly appointed for this merger by way of a reverse triangular merger
under Delaware law. In the second stage, the Daimler-Benz AG that had first been turned
into a subsidiary was merged into the DaimlerChrysler AG ("Daimler-Benz Merger"). The
purpose of this merger was to squeeze out shareholders who had not voluntarily accepted
the original Exchange Offer.
This was the result: Daimler-Benz AG disappeared into DaimlerChrysler AG with all
shareholders of Daimler-Benz now being shareholders of DaimlerChrysler AG. Chrysler
Corporation was turned into a wholly-owned subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler AG and
changed its name to Daimler-Chrysler Corporation.
The merger of equals concept figured prominently in these procedures. The original
exchange ratio in the Daimler-Benz capital increase was one DaimlerChrysler share for one
Daimler-Benz share. If, however, more than ninety percent of the Daimler-Benz shares
were exchanged, then the ratio was 1.005 DaimlerChrysler share for one Daimler-Benz
share. This was meant as an enticement to meet the ninety percent benchmark and reflected
the accounting realities. 98 Power of signs: as no goodwill had to be recorded, no reduction
of future earnings had to be feared. This reality is, however, not beyond doubts. As men-
tioned,M critics argue that the approach allows managers to make expensive acquisitions
with shareholders' money without recording the price of these decisions in the accounting
ledgers.
197. Melody Petersen, Accounting for Mergers May Change, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at C3.
198. See supra Part V.A.-E.
199. See Petersen, supra note 199.
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F. FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS
Notwithstanding intricate technicalities, this was not enough to arrive at a globally ac-
ceptable corporate structure. The Joint Report explains the situation as follows:
In the Business Combination Agreement the parties agreed to an overall plan for the business
combination of Daimler-Benz AG and the Chrysler Corporation into the DaimlerChrysler AG.
Agreements of this type are rare under German domestic law since corporate actions nec-
essary for the implementation of a business combination (such as capital increases and mergers)
already require separate agreements in accordance with the detailed provisions of the Stock
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) and the Transformation Act (Umwandlungsgesetz).
The proposed business combination of Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler Corporation in-
volves, however, two fundamentally different legal systems. In order to ensure the necessary
legal certainty of both companies, it was necessary to set forth the overall planning in one
agreement, namely the Business Combination Agreement, in accordance with U.S. practice.
The agreement is subject to the laws of the State of Delaware (U.S.A.) whose laws also govern
the Chrysler Corporation. The management of Daimler-Benz AG agreed to this choice of law
since the Daimler-Benz Capital Increase and the Daimler-Benz Merger must ultimately be
implemented according to German corporate law and German corporate transformation law.2°°
This agreement was regarded to be vitally important for the overall structure. Therefore,
it needed and received approval by seventy-five percent of the shareholders present at the
general meeting; a consequence of the famous Holzmueller doctrine2°' and by analogy to
the German Transformation Act.
G. DETAILS OF THE BUSINESS COMBINATION AGREEMENT
The Business Combination Agreement deals extensively with the corporate governance
of the newly created DaimlerChrysler AG, in particular with the impact of the German
codetermination concept (article MV). For the future, the Joint Report0 2 announces a
"Chairman Integration Council" with seven members. This Council lies "at the heart of
the management structure." Guidelines are set for the compensation structure for execu-
tives. In addition, the Agreement settles the employee benefit matters (article VII).
Most interesting are the provisions concerning the applicable law and questions of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The German law is the "governing law" for the Daimler-Benz Merger
(to the extent executed in Germany), for the Daimler-Benz Capital Increase, and for the
Chrysler Capital Exchange. In all other respects, the Agreement shall be governed by Dela-
ware law without regard to the principles of conflict of laws thereof.o3 With regard to the
Agreement and any of the transactions contemplated by it, the parties consented to submit
themselves to any federal court located in the state of Delaware or any Delaware state court.
They agreed not to deny or defeat such jurisdiction and not move to dismiss on the grounds
of forum non conveniens. The parties also promised not to bring any action in the matters
mentioned above in any other court and they waived any right to trial by jury. °4
200. Joint Report, supra note 191, at 36.
201. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Ertension of Parent Company Shareholders' Rights to Participate in the Governance
of Subsidiaries, 31 Am. J. CoMp. L. 511 (1983).
202. Joint Report, supra note 191, at 45.
203. Id. § 12.4.
204. See id. § 12.15.
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H. ETHICS
It could be argued that global standards are not a matter of prime concern as some glitches
in these concepts might be locked up in view of responsible actors, in view of corporate
ethics.05 Can we rely on ethics? What are "ethics" in a global economy when corporations
"have no soul?"06 Are we out for an elusive euphemism-in view of the "obvious multi-
plicity of global disparate qualities and values"? 07 Let's be honest: "the achievement of an
effective, desirable system of universal ethics in a global economy is more fanciful than
realistic. Nationalism in economics is unlikely to be ceded to generally observable systems
of global ethics. '"20 But is it wholly fantasy? Joseph Auerbach gives the following answer:
An ethics system which attracts adherents must have at its core two essential characteristics: it
must be more persuasive to international businesses and their home governments as an eco-
nomic incentive than a rash, heedless view of the consequences of less than ethical economic
behavior; and the system must rely for effectiveness not on laws but on persons, who are the
overseers, stewards and executive managers of the global businesses, having intrinsic qualities
of character likely to produce internationally acceptable unpremeditated ethical responses to
business questions. 0
The soul must be found in individuals. In an 1837 corporation case it was said:
A corporation cannot blush. It has a body it was true; had certainly a head-a new one every
year ... Arms he supposed it had, and long ones, too, for it could reach at any thing. Legs, of
course, when it made such long strides. A throat to swallow the rights of the community, and
a stomach to digest them! But whoever yet discovered, in the anatomy of any corporation,
either bowels, or a heart?21°
For ethics the focus has to be on individuals and on excellence in strategic management.
Only then can we hope for "establishing a system of business ethics with global signifi-
cance."
2
" These hopes might get some support from internal codes of conduct set up by
individual corporations.2 12 They are sometimes regarded with skepticism but they set a
benchmark to be met and expose these corporations to an enhanced public scrutiny. In the
field of labor conditions additional factors come in supporting each other and increasing
the impact: humanitarian impulses, public pressure from abroad, concern for brand name,
and corporate image.
VIII. Conclusion
Certainly, there is a loss of distance, but this does not mean the end of geography. The
virtual world is not the world as long as human beings continue to see the world as geog-
raphy,2 3 and as long as culture is derived from colere, cultus, which means "to cultivate the
205. For a critical view, see Auerbach, supra note 74.
206. Id. at 177.
207. Id. at 170.
208. Id. at 173.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 178.
211. Id. at 181.
212. Toftoy, supra note 30, at 905.
213. See Eric Peterson et al., Semantic Typology and Spatial Conceptualization, 74 LANGUAGE 557 (1998).
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earth." Even in a global market in a virtual world, business is local and the point of sale
determines the economic success. The national states are still very important players as they
only have the power to enforce legal norms that constitute and limit even global markets.
Law has always been and will continue to be a system of sufferance2l4 interacting with
markets and localities2I5 But the relation between each other is in flux. Global markets will
diminish the sovereign powers of states that depend on control over territory and borders.
But by the same token, the longing for "feeling at home" will flourish because human beings
need homes. They are exposed to different geographical pictures and to different semiotic
systems,l6which will lead them to see even the virtual world differently. That makes uni-
fication and harmonization in international corporation law not futile-but very difficult.2 7
However, it is clear that the traditional balance based on distance will change, and that
in-border concepts will come under increased scrutiny. The newly emerging structures will
not follow a unitary pattern as the balance has to be found in various fields according to
the characteristics of different assets, know-how, and markets. There is no single solution!
Predictions are difficult to make, as we do not know how order grows from chaos.28 Trial
and error will continue to be our companions. But this is a challenge and no reason for
resignation: "The business of the law is to make sense of the confusion of what we call
human life-to reduce it to order but at the same time to give it possibility, scope, even
dignity."2I9 This is the poetry (creativity) of law: "To compose an order which the bewil-
dered, angry heart can recognize. To imagine man."220 Geopolitical power is not the answer
if we want to keep the international system honest. Even states that wield great political
and economic power are not fully independent. They "remain[n] exposed to the risks cre-
ated by a robust and largely unmastered global economy,"22' and they remain exposed to
the power of the Internet to circumvent its sovereignty. They may try to master this by a
kind of "empirical overstretch" but the risks are that they will go over the brink somewhere
and sometime. Patient cooperation seems to be the better solution: we have the choice
between more conflicts or more common solutions.222 The loss of distance on global mar-
kets forces us to accept and to pursue a shared values approach." 3
214. See BERNHARD GROSSFELD, RECHT ALS LEIDENSORDNUNG (1998).
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